One of the enduring joys of having a pulpit, such as is provided
by the XML-Deviant column, is the chance to ride one's own hobby
horses. While the point of the XML-Deviant column is to
represent the most interesting and important facets of debate
within the XML development community, it also affords me a
chance to promote or demote things, based upon my sense of what
is true, good, right, or useful.
RDF is one of my hobby horses, a technology which I have consciously
sought to promote in these pages, fairly and honestly, whenever the
occasion presented itself. I have written often about RDF ("Go Tell It
On the Mountain", "RDF, What's
It Good For?, "RPV: Triples
Made Plain", and "Creative
Comments: On the Uses and Abuses of Markup"), as well as about
technologies built on top it ("If Ontology,
Then Knowledge: Catching Up With WebOnt" and "The True
Meaning of Service"). My goal has generally been to
suggest that RDF is a good choice for particular kinds of data
representation tasks; that it is a tool every web
programmer should know how to use to her advantage. The particular
kinds of data representation problem to which RDF is suited include
those in which some or all of the first-class objects are web
resources (that is, things which have a URL), or those in which some
or all of the first-class objects are amenable to being named with
URIs. That is not an inconsequential problem domain.
RDF is frequently described as a tool for representing
knowledge, but therein lies a hornet's nest of deeply
conceptual questions, better left undisturbed if you
can help it. Sometimes, however, the hornet's nest has to be
overturned because it is necessary to address the deep
conceptual questions directly. The formal blessing of RDF
specifications, especially "RDF Concepts and Abstract
Syntax", is a case in point. In what remains of
this column, I review some of the vigorous debate surrounding one
troublesome section of this document, section
4.
The Social Meaning Debate
As it so happens, a meeting will be convened in Boston tomorrow, 6
March, 2003, the day after I am writing this column, to discuss the
issues raised by section 4. The
agenda of this meeting is publicly accessible, so if you're very
interested, you can follow along in detail from afar. I present the
high points of that agenda in the next few paragraphs.
The RDF Concepts and Abstract Syntax specification (hereafter,
"Concepts")
says that an
RDF graph ("a set of triples", according to Concepts 3.1) has two
kinds of meaning: a
formal and a social meaning. The formal meaning of an RDF graph
results from applying the RDF
semantics, based on model-theoretic semantics, to the
graph. But, as both Concepts and the RDF semantics documents
suggest, there is another aspect to the meaning of an RDF graph, the
social meaning. The social meaning is the place, one might say
colloquially, where RDF meets and interacts with the real world. The
debate about the social meaning of RDF, and the subject matter
occupying much of the agenda of tomorrow's meeting, concerns whether
and, if so, how the social meaning of RDF should be formally
specified in the Concepts document.
In order to provide you with a better grasp of the issues involved,
I want to quote the most relevant parts of section 4:
When an RDF graph is asserted in the Web, its publisher is saying
something about their view of the world. Such an assertion should be
understood to carry the same social import and responsibilities as
an assertion in any other format. A combination of social
(e.g. legal) and technical machinery (protocols, file formats,
publication frameworks) provide the contexts that fix the intended
meanings of the vocabulary of some piece of RDF, and which
distinguish assertions from other uses (e.g. citations, denials or
illustrations)…
The social machinery includes the form of publication: publishing
some unqualified statements on one's World Wide Web home page would
generally be taken as an assertion of those statements. But
publishing the same statements with a qualification, such as "here
are some common myths", or as part of a rebuttal, would likely not
be construed as an assertion of the truth of those
statements. Similar considerations apply to the publication of
assertions expressed in RDF.
An RDF graph may contain "defining information" that is opaque to
logical reasoners. This information may be used by human
interpreters of RDF information, or programmers writing software to
perform specialized forms of deduction in the Semantic Web.
The debate about these issues is very complex, primarily because it
crosses, and then recrosses, many distinct but related disciplinary
boundaries. It has recently crystallized around an extended set
of comments and reactions to section 4 by Bijan Parsia. Parsia's
general objection to section 4 runs something like this: given that
formally specifying "social meaning" is an incredibly complex
task (and not one especially relevant to the Working Group's charter),
made only more complex by trying to specify it in relation to
a formal system such as RDF, Concepts section 4 is, to quote Parsia, "vacuous ... it doesn't really specify
anything and thus can be ignored ... or it's dangerously
underthought and underspecified".
Parsia also makes the relevance argument, focusing on section
4.4 of Concepts, which says that if you publish RDF content you
thereby "commit [yourself] to the mechanically-inferred social
obligations" of that RDF. Setting aside the ambiguity of
"mechanically-inferred", surely, as Parsia notes, that claim
falters: either because the W3C lacks the grounds upon which to make
such a claim authoritatively, or because it is intended to be merely
informative, in which case it is, as Parsia says, "probably false".
The Unresolved Issues
The specific issues over which some consensus must be formed before
Concepts can become a formal W3C Recommendation include the
following:
how or whether the meaning of URIs (when used, for example, as
RDF predicates) is defined and defined authoritatively -- and
whether, or to what degree, Concepts must make this explicit (see
Concepts 4.3 Authoritative Definition of Terms);
what Concepts means by saying that "an RDF graph may contain
'defining information' that is opaque to logical reasoners", that
is, what is the meaning of this "defining information"? (see section
4.2 Social Meaning);
how one asserts, or refrains from asserting, RDF statements (see
Concepts 4.1 Asserted and Non-asserted Forms);
how one specifies the meaning of an RDF graph, which presupposes
some position on the relation of an RDF graph's formal meaning,
social meaning, and social meaning of its "formal entailments" (see
Concepts section 4.4 Interaction Between Social and Formal
Meaning);
whether non-RDF contexts, including various technical details of
the Web's architecture (protocols, file formats, and so on), are
sufficient to "fix the intended meanings of the vocabulary of some
piece of RDF" (in the words of the Social Meaning Discussion
Agenda), and, more crucially, whether the social meaning of RDF
assertions is a function of the intention of the speaker
("speaker meaning") or is a function of the meaning of the assertion
itself ("sentence meaning") (see Concepts section 4.2 Social
Meaning);
whether "publishing" RDF is sufficient to obligate one to its
formal or social meanings and, further, what acts or ommissions
constitute a party as the "publisher" or as the "asserter" of
RDF;
finally, what relation there is between RDF's meaning, whether
social or formal, and legal contexts and considerations (see
Concepts section 4.5).
In short, there remain significant issues to be resolved before RDF
Concepts progresses in the W3C recommendation process. There are at
least two different kinds of difficulty.
First, these issues (knowledge representation, the
relation of formal and social systems, the meaning of meaning, and
so on) are simply very difficult. If they were easy, we would have
had something like RDF a long time ago, or at the least there
would be even more unemployed philosophers and logicians
around. Second, these issues cut across areas internal to the
institutional politics of the W3C and its constitutents. RDF is in a
very real sense, as my grandmother would have put it, the red-headed
stepchild of the W3C. Without the active support of Tim Berners-Lee,
RDF might have suffered a far worse fate than controversy and
debate, namely, obscurity and abandon.
Further, these issues are complicated by the fact that Berners-Lee
both participates actively in the development of RDF
recommendations, in which he is one among equals, and is also able
to speak, ex cathedra, as the W3C's Director. Berners-Lee has
participated in the social meaning debates so far, and his position
-- which he has so far expressed outside his institutional role and
authority as W3C Director -- is worth mentioning here. In
his view, Concepts requires a statement of "what an RDF document
means" and, further, that statement is an easy one to make.
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This seems to fly in the face of the debate about RDF's social
meaning. In other words, if it's easy, why does it seem so hard?
Why are so many smart people having such a hard time doing an
easy thing? One option, after all, is simply to refrain from
taking a position about these very difficult issues. But that
does not appear to be a viable option at this point,
given Berners-Lee's view that such a statement is
required. Further, we must distinguish carefully what
an RDF document means from "explain[ing] how to use it", which
is not required of the Concepts specification, in Berners-Lee's
view.
In my view the only thing which is required is a clear statement
of how the formal meaning of an RDF document is to be arrived
at. While it is true that, in various social contexts, this
formal meaning may well have a further social meaning,
specifying that social meaning is a very difficult thing to do
well. It is also outside the scope of RDF recommendations per
se, and may well be pointless insofar as social meaning is
typically not amenable to authoritative pronouncement, even from
institutions which are legitimately entrusted with the relevant
kind of authority. Even the U.S. Supreme Court, which has the
authority to determine a kind of social meaning (the legal
kind), did not arrive at that position solely by the fiat of
another U.S. institution, but, rather, by a historical,
evolutionary process. Whatever social import RDF as a whole, or
any specific RDF statement, has will be something which is
determined not by the fiat of any one institution, but by the
same organic, historical social process out of which social
meaning is always formed.